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Abstract 
The theory and practice of advertising self-regulation have been evolving for decades in 
pursuit of basic standards for advertising quality. In Spain, this discipline was put into 
practice in 1995, the year the Association for the Self-Regulation of Commercial 
Communication (Autocontrol) was created. This article aims to examine in depth the 
functioning of the Spanish advertising self-regulation (ASR) system, with special 
emphasis on the Advertising Jury, and explore to what extent some of the normative 
requirements of rigour, independence, and participation can be considered to have been 
met. The paper is based on a case study in which interviews with Autocontrol members, 
Jury members and consumer associations have particular bearing. The results shed light 
on the achievements of Autocontrol’s self-regulation work and the challenges it still 
faces. 
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Introduction: The practice of commercial advertising requires advertising self-
regulation (ASR) 
 
Advertising self-regulation (ASR) is an important theoretical and practical field that has 
been pursuing mechanisms to resolve moral problems in advertising for several 
decades. Spain introduced self-regulation in 1995, with the creation of the Association 
for the Self-Regulation of Commercial Communication (Autocontrol) (Medina and An, 
2012). Over its two-year history, Autocontrol has consolidated a broad and complex 
structure, through which it aims to safeguard “true, legal, honest and loyal advertising” 
(Autocontrol).
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 The association describes its work as both to assess “the ethical and 
  
legal correction of campaigns before their emission” and to deontologically resolve 
advertising-related complaints from the public and competitors. 
Implementing ASR involves debates on the regulatory conditions required to 
promote a self-regulation system that guarantees the interests of both industry and 
consumers. Various ASR models claim that the advertising industry adopts an active 
and committed responsibility in their organisations (SRO) and their instruments (ethical 
codes, copy advice or pre-clearance procedures, and complaint handling), which leads 
to significant consumer participation and involvement (Marsden 2008). Briefly, one of 
the key concerns in the ASR literature is to ensure that the element of industry “self” 
(responsibility) remains (Fusi and Boddewyn 1986), but without resulting in a model 
that “confuses self-regulation with self-service” (Dacko and Hart 2005, p. 8); that is, 
without turning into a model “which may involve too few consumers and too many 
industry-selected representatives who may therefore be no more than ‘token’ outsiders 
and meek participants in the self-regulatory process” (Dacko and Hart 2005, p. 8).  
In response to this concern, varying ASR models have stressed the need to 
consolidate rigorous, transparent and rapid procedures for process management and 
conflict resolution in advertising. They also highlight the importance of opening up 
these mechanisms to active participation from outsiders (Ginosar 2014; 2011). Concepts 
such as stakeholders or multi-stakeholders, self-regulation (Marsden 2008; 2011; 
Ginosar 2014; Hyman 2009) and ASR decentralisation (Black 2001) therefore abound 
in the ASR literature, along with numerous debates on the role of outsider participation 
in the process of regulation, self-regulation, and co-regulation (Senden 2005; Ginosar 
2014; Prosser 2008; Bonzel and Risse 2010). 
  
The aim of this paper is to examine in depth the Spanish ASR system, with 
particular emphasis on its core structures, such as the Autocontrol Jury. The study asks 
how close certain Autocontrol key participants (both internal and external) consider the 
organisation is to meeting some of the ideal requirements in terms of rigour, 
independence and participation. In short, the study observes both the potential 
challenges to and improvements pending in the SRO Autocontrol.  
 
Methodology 
 
Case study methodology, a qualitative research technique, was used to analyse 
Autocontrol. The study specifically examined the organisation’s key self-regulation 
instrument, namely, how it handles the complaints received. The case-study technique 
involved examining various sources and materials connected to Autocontrol’s 
Advertising Jury. Specifically, two main source types were used: 
● Reports, documents, resolutions and statutes published by Autocontrol on its 
website (http://www.Autocontrol.es/), together with reports published by the 
European Advertising Standards Alliance, EASA (http://www.easa-
alliance.org/), about ASR’s performance at the European level.  
 
● In-depth interviews with  
 
o Internal actors, including 1) Jury Members and 2) Autocontrol 
Members.
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o External actors, mainly 1) associations that filed at least one complaint in 
2015; 2) a national consumer association, FACUA, that was previously 
active in Autocontrol but ended its participation in this ASR; and 3) the 
Observatory of Women’s Image, a state-funded organisation that 
scrutinises advertising.
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An analysis of the extensive documentation (reports, resolutions, etc.) associated with 
Autocontrol was key to understanding the organisation’s work and structure. The 
material from the interviews provided a deeper understanding of the position of the Jury 
Members, Autocontrol Members and consumer associations vis-à-vis the Spanish ASR 
system and the dynamics of the Advertising Jury. The interviews followed a semi-
structured model that created a space for interviewees to freely express their opinions on 
the study objective.  
 
Literature review 
 
The study of self-regulation has given rise to a broad stream of theoretical literature in 
the last 35 years; analyses of the role and potential of self-regulation for achieving 
acceptable standards of advertising quality are particularly notable (Boddewyn 1989; 
Harker 1998). Harker (1998) states that the various self-regulation proposals tend to fall 
into two groups. The first group includes descriptive proposals comparing self-
regulation systems in different countries (Harker 1998; Harker and Harker 2002). These 
studies include Boddewyn (1989; 1992), Burleton (1982) and more recent analyses 
(Verbruggen, 2014; López Jiménez 2012; Medina and An 2012). The second group 
  
covers a series of prescriptive proposals setting out normative ideals about how ASR 
programmes and systems should be developed. This typology includes Armstrong and 
Ozanne (1983) Boddewyn (1985) and Muela-Molina and Perelló-Oliver (2014). A 
considerable portion of ASR studies aims to define models of governance that should 
(ideally) characterise these mechanisms. On the one hand, ASR studies recognise that 
the actors involved in taking it forward and putting it into practice (industry) must be 
firmly committed to the task of promoting honest advertising. On the other hand, the 
legitimacy of the way these mechanisms are implemented also depends on the 
confidence that they generate among the public and consumers. Thus, self-regulation 
only involves “self” insofar as it is implemented by the industry itself, while it gains 
respect and legitimacy so long as its commitment is perceived as real and useful by the 
public (Boddewyn 1989; 1992). Therefore, in this search for regulatory measures and 
complementary tools to guarantee the interests of industry and consumers, since the 
beginnings of ASR there has been a profound debate on how ethical management tools 
can regulate such a complex and changing environment as advertising, given that they 
must be designed to safeguard the (potentially conflicting) interests of advertisers and 
consumers. 
 On this question, ASR models aimed to identify several key aspects from the 
outset. There is a general agreement that such boards and committees are needed to 
promote the principles of independence and transparency, considered to be the two 
basic principles for gaining the public’s trust and acceptance of ASR (Muela-Molina 
and Perelló-Oliver 2014; Armstrong and Ozanne 1983; Fusi and Boddewyn 1986). To 
achieve this objective, normative models require a considerable number of outsiders to 
be incorporated onto ethics boards and juries (García-Marzá 2004; Author 2 2007). In 
  
other words, incorporating people from outside the advertising industry is regarded as 
crucial to avoid conflicts of interest during complaint-resolution procedures (Boddewyn 
1985 and 1989; Muela-Molina and Perelló-Oliver 2014; Verbruggen 2014). Similarly, 
the principle of independence must be upheld in order to prevent such boards from 
becoming mere corporate self-defence mechanisms rather than acting as impartial 
conflict-resolution bodies (Aznar 2005; Fernando Magarzo 2011).  
 Several prominent descriptive studies have specifically suggested that the public 
are generally sceptical about self-regulation (Ginosar 2014). One of the public’s main 
concerns is the limited margin SROs have to avoid the potential dependence on industry 
interests (Dacko and Hart 2005). Some studies also note the gradual decline of 
consumer associations’ participation in such mechanisms in favour of increased 
competition among the companies themselves (Harker 2000). Research also points to 
the generally more positive and favourable attitude of juries to complaints from 
companies than to those from the public, who are regarded as amateur or emotional 
(Harker 2000).  
Some studies also reflect industry concerns about ASR, identifying the possible 
loss of the “self” component in the process of self-regulation if a high percentage of 
outsiders becomes established and leads to a predominance of external groups (Fusi and 
Boddewyn 1986). This aspect may discourage companies’ commitment to – or interest 
in – these types of mechanisms.  
 Another increasingly important debate is the complex relationship between the 
mechanisms of legal or ethical self-regulation (Rotfeld 1992; Rotfeld and Taylor 2009), 
particularly when differentiating and comparing self-regulation, co-regulation and 
regulation (Senden 2005; Ginosar 2014; Prosser 2008; Bonzel and Risse 2010). In this 
  
complex and polysemic debate, authors use some concepts, especially self-regulation 
and co-regulation, with different and sometimes overlapping meanings. It has even been 
stated that “there is no longer a place for the dichotomy of state regulation and market 
self-regulation” (Ginosar 2014, p. 297). Several of the current analyses on these 
mechanisms claim there is “a continuum between different regulatory regimens” along 
which varying degrees of public and private input are established and where the 
different levels of stakeholder participation are distributed (Prossen 2008, p. 101). The 
globalisation process (which also applies to advertising messages), the growing debate 
on governance models, and the emergence of new advertising forms via the Internet 
have only heightened the importance of this discussion in recent years.  
For this study, however, it is especially significant to see how the debate on the 
public’s and consumers’ role in models of ethical governance of advertising remains 
effective and even more consequential today. In this respect, Marsden says “the 
involvement of consumer-citizens at a more legitimised and consensual level than the 
industry ASR is still a novel approach” (2008, p. 116). This author postulates the need 
to consolidate a multi-stakeholder governance model (Marsden 2008; 2011). Ginosar, 
meanwhile, argues that the debate between self-regulation and co-regulation focuses 
primarily on the role consumers should play in the SRO and its importance in 
preventing these mechanisms from consolidating as tools to exclusively protect the 
interests of the industry (Ginosar 2014, p. 298). Thus, the classic debate on ASR, 
introduced by Boddewyn among others (1985; 1988; 1992), gains importance with 
models that call for a multi-stakeholder or decentralised model of governance. 
Verbruggen’s (2014) recent study on SROs in France, the Netherlands, the UK and 
Germany also addresses the issue of non-industry stakeholders being included on juries 
  
to prevent the “constant risk of [their] being captured by industry interests” (2014, p. 
82). Verbruggen highlights this principle as key both for strengthening credibility and 
for “bolstering the enforcement capacity of SROs” (2014, p. 82). 
This debate transcends the academy’s interruption of various SROs. It is worth 
mentioning, in this regard, point 7 of Appendix 3 to the European Advertising Standards 
Alliance (EASA) Best Practice Self-Regulatory Model whose recommendations include 
the need for “A self-regulatory system [that] must be able to demonstrate that it can 
judge cases brought before it efficiently, professionally and above all impartially”. 
Thus, it considers that: 
They must be subject neither to the influence of the advertising industry or any 
particular industry sector or company, nor of government, NGOs or other 
interest groups. The complaints committee should have a majority of 
independent members and its chairman should be an independent person 
(EASA). 
 
The importance of ASR systems has driven the recent expansion of studies 
examining the Spanish case of Autocontrol, its characteristics and its evolution (Martín 
and Hernández, 2011; Fernando Magarzo 2011; Patiño Alves 2007). Authors such as 
López-Jiménez consider the Advertising Jury as the “preferred [mechanism] for 
resolving advertising conflicts in Spain, even above legal tribunals” (2012, p. 58). 
Similarly, he concludes that the Jury is defined by “absolute autonomy and 
independence in its functions and formed by independent persons” (2012, p. 58). 
Medina and An also arrive at a similar conclusion, pointing out that “In spite of the 
voluntary nature of the system, the moral strength that accompanies the Jury’s 
  
pronouncements is undeniable” (2012, p. 20). Other studies of Autocontrol have been 
more critical of its work. Fernández Souto, for example, notes its failure to consider any 
cases of sexist advertising during its first three years (2000). In a comparative study 
with the ASA, Muela-Molina and Perelló-Oliver conclude that Autocontrol suffers from 
problems on various levels, especially concerning the level of independence of its Jury 
members (Muela-Molina and Perelló-Oliver 2014).  
However, in the literature on self-regulation in general and Autocontrol in 
particular, few studies examine the opinion of the actors involved in the process of self-
regulation and their appreciation of whether an SRO such as Autocontrol comes 
anywhere near a model that effectively promotes self-regulation and meets the 
principles of rigour, transparency, independence and participation in its work. The 
present study aims to shed some light on whether consumers’, Autocontrol members’ 
and Jury members’ expectations of Autocontrol self-regulatory mechanisms are 
satisfied. This descriptive study of the mechanism and its methods aims to integrate a 
range of different voices that allow us to appreciate the progress achieved over 20 years 
of experience as well as the potential challenges that remain pending. We also delve 
into the incentives or disincentives that motivate consumers and their associations to 
participate in these self-regulatory mechanisms.  
 
An analysis of the structure of Autocontrol and its Advertising Jury 
 
As mentioned above, Spain’s system of self-regulation in the advertising sphere began 
with Autocontrol, which emerged under the umbrella of the European Advertising 
Standards Alliance (EASA), a European organisation charged with promoting the 
  
spread of these bodies in various countries within the European Union. Autocontrol 
began as an initiative involving publicity, advertising and media agencies that aimed to 
establish the basic “rules of the game”. The objective of this organisation is to ensure 
the industry responds to the public’s demands with the goal of offering guarantees that 
facilitate trust and belief in advertising (Boddewyn 1992). Similarly, Autocontrol 
defines itself as a useful complement to, but not a replacement for, the laws that regulate 
advertising activity (Aznar and Catalán 2010).  
Some of the aspects included in Autocontrol’s goals are:  
1) Promoting ethical reflection on advertising activity; 
2) Developing instruments for public engagement by advertisers and 
publicity agencies; 
3) Ethically assessing advertisers and publicity agencies; and 
4) Studying complaints from various sources (consumers, competitors, 
other agencies, etc.) about advertisements considered to violate the 
advertising code of conduct.  
 
The fourth purpose – the implementation of ethics committees or juries – has 
been consolidated in various theories over the years and such committees have been 
incorporated into self-regulation systems because of their potential to drive and 
consolidate these mechanisms (Aznar 2005; Fusi and Boddewyn 1986; Armstrong and 
Ozanne 1983). These juries receive complaints about advertisements, examine them 
from a deontological perspective, and write reports and resolutions scrutinising them. 
They have the potential to promote the principles of transparency, independence, and 
participation (Muela-Molina and Perelló-Oliver 2014). We now consider in detail the 
  
workings of Autocontrol’s Advertising Jury, the levels of participation it reaches, and 
the profiles of the Jury members and complainants.  
 
Autocontrol’s Advertising Jury and levels of participation 
 
Autocontrol defines its Advertising Jury as an extrajudicial body for resolving 
controversies and complaints about advertising material. It is, therefore, a specialised 
deontological advertising body; 75% of its members are appointed directly by 
Autocontrol’s Board of Directors, whose members are mainly company representatives 
and some media actors (Ramos 2003; Fernando Magarzo 2011)
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. Since 1999, the 
remaining 25% of the Jury’s members have been nominated by the National Consumer 
Institute and the Agency for Consumer Affairs, Food Safety and Nutrition 
(AECOSAN).
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 The incorporation of 25% of the Jury members from external sources is 
designed to strengthen independence and impartiality in the deliberative processes of 
evaluating complaints, which is the basic pillar of the consolidation and improvement of 
ASR in Spain (Gómez, 2001). This 25% share was decided by the Autocontrol Board of 
Directors, in line with the proposal from AECOSAN (Ramos 2001). The Jury operates 
both as a full board (with a minimum of 6 members) and in sections (with 3 members); 
the sections arbitrate on complaints filed against advertisements, and the full board 
resolves appeals and hands down rulings. 
 
Levels of participation in the context of the EASA 
 
  
Participation can be evaluated through the two advertising self-regulation routes used by 
Autocontrol: Copy Advice and the Advertising Jury. The copy-advice process, aimed at 
industry members, is a non-binding ethical assessment service Autocontrol offers 
advertisers in advance of their campaign launches. Since 2012, this service has received 
20,000 requests each year, the second-highest level of this type of activity in Europe. 
Copy Advice is an internal self-regulation system that companies can engage with on a 
voluntary basis. Consumer groups are not involved in this process, which consists of a 
team of 47 lawyers who advise on the possible validity of a draft advertisement in line 
with Autocontrol’s (ethical) code, prior to its release.  
The second process, the Advertising Jury’s resolution of complaints and 
demands filed in relation to published advertisements, has increased since 2001, with 
the number of complaints ranging from 146 in 2010 to 305 in 2015. Nevertheless, the 
difference between the two types of participation provided by Autocontrol is significant 
compared to systems such as the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) in the United 
Kingdom (which received more than 37,000 complaints in 2015), Zentrale zur 
Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs (WBZ) in Germany (13,157 complaints in 2015), 
and Reklamombudsmannen in Sweden (Ro.) (4,985 complaints in 2015).6 
These annual figures show the gradual consolidation of Autocontrol as a basic 
instrument for implementing ASR in Spain. A notable aspect of its preventive work is 
the extent to which internal actors use Autocontrol’s Copy Advice service. Regarding 
its corrective work and participation of external actors, Autocontrol receives more than 
300 complaints annually, which places it in eleventh position in the EASA
7
. However, 
in this section it falls well below the levels of participation seen in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, and Ireland. It is important to note, 
  
however, the difficulty of making direct comparisons between countries because of the 
different weight of the copy-advice and complaint-handling systems in each SRO. ASA 
(UK) is an outstanding example of high participation where both systems obtain a high 
number of applications. Meanwhile, Germany and the Netherlands traditionally focus 
their self-regulatory action on ex post complaint handling as a regulatory strategy, 
which explains the high numbers of these claims (13,157 and 3,245, respectively). 
France has 15,309 ex ante controls and 3,171 on ex post complaint handling. The 
comparisons by country are subject, therefore, to the peculiarities of each SRO (for the 
specific cases of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, see Verbruggen, 
2014); however, it is important to remember that in Spain, the system of complaint 
handling, created in 1996, is considered by Autocontrol to be at the core of its self-
regulatory process. The Copy Advice system, introduced in 2001, is defined as “a 
complement of the advertisement post-emission control system”.8  
 
The profile of the board members 
 
Autocontrol notes in its organisational chart that the Advertising Jury “is the key piece 
in our self-regulatory system”.9 At the same time, Autocontrol defines the Jury as a 
“specialised and independent organ for the extrajudicial resolution of controversies and 
complaints regarding commercial communication”.10 It is therefore important to 
conduct a detailed examination of the Board’s composition, which comprises the 
president, five vice-presidents, and 15 spokespeople.  
An analysis of the members of the Jury in 2016 shows a high proportion of 
members with an academic background, particularly from the legal profession. All six 
  
section presidents are law professors (four in commercial law – sections 1, 2, 3 and 6, 
and two in administrative law – sections 4 and 5). The Jury’s president and technical 
secretary are also professors of commercial law. Similarly, there are notable academics 
(albeit fewer in number) in the fields of economics and communications; for example, 
an economics professor is a spokesperson in section 4, and a communications professor 
is a spokesperson in section 2. However, the Spanish Association of Advertisers is 
heavily represented: four spokespeople – two in section 1, one in section 3, and one in 
section 4 – are former members of this association.  
Finally, another notable aspect is that 25% of the Jury are proposed by 
agreement with AECOSAN. This section has strong links with state institutions: five of 
its six members come from state organisations, specifically the Spanish Agency for 
Consumer Affairs AECOSAN (1 spokesperson in section 1), the Councils of Health (2 
spokespeople in sections 2 and 3), and the Council of Education, Youth and Sports (1 
spokesperson in section 6). It is particularly noteworthy that no ethics professionals or 
academics sit on the Jury, and nor are there any representatives from consumer 
associations that are fully independent of the state.  
 
The profile of complainants and type of complaints 
 
The number of demands filed by the public (i.e., citizens’ organisations or consumer 
associations) is important information for evaluating or measuring participation levels 
in this type of self-regulatory mechanism. The principle of participation acquires special 
relevance in such mechanisms. Autocontrol’s annual reports differentiate four groups of 
complainants to the Advertising Board: 1) consumers or consumer associations and 
  
other citizens’ organisations, 2) businesses or business associations, 3) cross-border 
complaints, and 4) administrative bodies. 
Autocontrol’s reports pay special attention to participation of the group 
“Consumers or consumer associations and other citizens’ organisations” and note its 
increasing relevance. In 2013, 81.67% of the total number of complaints came from this 
group.
11
 In 2015, 79% of the complaints came from consumers and associations.
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 An 
in-depth analysis of this information furthers our understanding of consumers’ levels of 
participation.  
Several aspects emerge from the detailed analysis of the 305 complaints lodged 
in 2015. Of these 305 complaints, 182 were finally discussed by the Jury (some of these 
complaints do not reach the Jury stage either because the complainant and the company 
come to a prior agreement or because the complaint is not admitted). The category of 
consumers and associations lodging complaints is clearly predominated by two groups. 
The first consists of private individuals (whose anonymity is protected throughout the 
process), who lodged 105 complaints, and the second is the Association of 
Communications Users (Asociación de Usuarios de la Comunicación, AUC), which 
lodged 37 complaints. That is, of the 182 complaints lodged, these two groups account 
for 142 (78% of the total).  
Turning exclusively to the consumer organisations that participated in 
Autocontrol’s complaint system in 2015, in addition to the 37 complaints from the 
AUC, the Consumers’ Union of the Valencian Community (Unión de Consumidores de 
la Comunidad Valenciana) lodged 6 complaints. The rest of the participating 
associations each lodged one complaint. These associations included the Farmers’ 
Union (Unió de Llauradors i Ramaders), the Pedestrians’ Association (Asociación A 
  
Pie), CGT Bankia, the Spanish Committee of Representatives of People with 
Disabilities (Representantes de Personas con Discapacidad, CERMI), the General 
Council of Associations of Psychologists (Consejo General de Colegios Oficiales de 
Psicólogos), and the Web Users Association (Associación de Internautas) (see Figure 
1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentages of complaints about advertisements exclusively from associations in 2015. 
Source: The authors  
 
These data reflect the significant concentration of complaints by two groups 
(individuals and AUC), and the limited range of consumer groups or associations that 
choose to participate in Spain’s ASR process. There is also a significant absence of 
participation from other consumer associations that are active in the field of monitoring 
and controlling advertising content; this observation applies to other years as well as 
2015 (Author 1, 2013). The absence of associations such as FACUA (which had 
  
previously been active in Autocontrol) in this process is also a key point of interest in 
this study.  
 
Type of complaints Favourable 
resolution 
Partially 
favourable 
resolution 
Dismissed Total 
Misleading advertising 
(Article 14) 
21 4 47 72 
Non-compliance with 
the law and regulations 
(Article 2) 
25 _ 15 40 
Discriminatory 
advertising 
(Article 10) 
12 _ 6 18 
Lack of coherence 
between the main 
message and secondary 
messages 
(Article 3.3) 
5 1 _ 6 
Denigration of other 
companies, products, or 
services 
(Article 21) 
2 _ 3 5 
Undue exposure of 
children and adolescents 
to inappropriate material  
(Article 28) 
2 _ 1 3 
Table 1. Typology of the most common complaints based on Autocontrol’s Code of Conduct (2015) 
Source: The authors 
 
Another important aspect to consider is the type of complaints received. Of the 182 
complaints resolved by the Advertising Jury, 162 concerned the advertising code of 
conduct, predominantly complaints related to misleading advertising (72 cases) and the 
principle of legality (40). In this analysis, it is striking to note that 18 complaints 
involve cases of possibly discriminatory advertising. While this is the third reason for 
complaints, this advertising self-regulation mechanism receives fewer complaints than 
  
other specialised organisations such as the Observatory of Women’s Image. This state-
funded institute received 144 notices of complaint against possible discriminatory 
advertising in 2013 and 229 in 2014; it acted 39 times against companies (2015 data are 
not yet available).
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Perceptions of Jury members, Autocontrol members and associations on the 
Spanish ASR system  
 
In this section we aim to build on the knowledge gained from studying reports and 
procedures described above by obtaining a detailed understanding of Autocontrol’s 
workings and dynamics from the experiences of the participating actors. Varied points 
of view on the operations, the work and the potential for Autocontrol have emerged 
throughout this research. However, the study has also revealed common positions held 
by consumer associations, Jury members and Autocontrol members, especially in their 
perceptions on the process of complaint resolution. Differences have also been detected, 
however, leaving some questions open, especially on the principle of independence and 
the possible incentives (or disincentives) for consumer participation in this SRO. 
Information extracted from the interviews has helped us differentiate certain basic 
characteristics in the positions of consumer groups, Autocontrol members and Jury 
members vis-à-vis the Spanish SRO. We group these characteristics into three 
categories: a) Autocontrol’s strong bridges, b) the complex principle of independence, 
and c) windows of opportunity to foster participation. 
 
  
Autocontrol’s strong bridges: adapting procedure to respect timeframes and promote 
professionalism  
 
 With regard to the complaint-resolution procedure, the majority of those 
interviewed (Autocontrol members, Jury members and consumer associations) valued 
the high level of professionalism in Autocontrol’s processes. Compared to other 
administrative or judicial methods available to formalise complaints about commercial 
advertisements, Autocontrol is considered to be serious, efficient and fast. All the Jury 
members interviewed defined the process as agile, fast, rigorous, and efficient. They 
also believe that cases are accompanied by ample information and that the terms of 
resolutions are appropriate. Consumer associations also make positive comments on the 
agility and professionalism involved in resolving advertising claims. Even actors that no 
longer use this route recognise the effectiveness of the Autocontrol process. Some of the 
interviewees conclude as follows: 
Let’s say that of all the available options, the fastest and most efficient, 
without a doubt, is Autocontrol, because it allows one to substantiate a 
procedure or resolve a complaint in a few weeks. [...] It is about acting 
quickly, even more so in the realm of publicity, and Autocontrol guarantees 
fast action (AUC). 
 
In the same vein, the UCCV values Autocontrol’s speed, defining it as “a simple, fast 
and agile course to resolve the incidents that can occur in an element as commonplace 
and basic as an advertisement.” The Pedestrians’ Association also expressed these 
opinions, noting that “communication worked, the response was reasonably fast and we 
  
believe that it was not just protocol”. The interviewees’ general perception of the 
various stages of the procedure is, therefore, satisfactory. Seriousness, professionalism, 
and speed were some of the most common evaluations provided by the interviewees. 
 Another point common to the interviewees’ responses was the widespread 
defence and increasing importance of Copy Advice. Autocontrol members claim it is 
“very useful as an internal tool” (Autocontrol Member 2). Usefulness is explained 
mainly as “the sooner the advertisement message problems are detected, the sooner they 
are avoided” (Autocontrol Member 1). The associations generally take the same 
position on Copy Advice, noting the importance of preventing conflicts in advance, 
while supporting the strategy of raising awareness among advertisers as a fundamental 
step towards improving advertising. Indeed, raising awareness is deemed to be as 
important as punishing the advertiser for bad practices. The Observatory of Women’s 
Image, the UCCV, and the AUC were particularly insistent on the importance of raising 
awareness, a process in which providing copy advice is fundamental.  
 
In search of the complex principle of independence  
 
As noted above, one of the key debates surrounding SROs concerns the principle of 
independence by guaranteeing a pluralistic and balanced representation on juries. We 
observed significant divergence on this point among the different groups studied.  
On the one hand, Autocontrol members advocate full Jury independence. They 
claim that the rigorous protocol in place ensures this independence and that “in Spain, 
all Jury members are independent of the industry” (Autocontrol Member 1). Another 
Autocontrol member also stated that “the key is not that 25% of the members of the 
  
Jury are appointed by consumers; it is that 0% comes from industry” (Autocontrol 
Member 2). Autocontrol defends the relevance of Jury members being “independent, 
without any link to the industry and with measures to ensure their impartiality, such as, 
for example, having a predetermined term of office, having a number of causes for 
abstention and recusal, and therefore, not acting as anyone’s spokespersons or 
representatives” (Autocontrol Member 1).  
 Consumer associations take a different view. There is a generalised perception 
among all the interviewees on the impact of the unequal representation of the Jury 
members. On this issue, the Farmers’ Union notes that Autocontrol shows “Speed and 
diligence, but is then a bit distant” in a process in which “we do not feel defended nor 
represented, not at all.” The Union compares its experience to a type of “David versus 
Goliath fight when trying to file a complaint about an advertisement from a 
multinational [company].” On the representation of plural interests in Autocontrol’s 
mechanisms, the AUC notes that 
[t]hese are bodies that necessarily – by having been created by advertisers, in 
which agencies participate, media agencies, the media and such – represent the 
point of view of the industry. […] Autocontrol does achieve a clear separation 
between the claimant and the claimee, but it is true that when there is doubt, on 
issues that could be more open to debate, Autocontrol’s tendency is, obviously, 
to see things more from the point of view of the industry than from the point of 
view of the consumers. 
FACUA, the consumer association that stopped using Autocontrol after lodging several 
complaints in the 1990s, presents the most critical position.
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 This association notes that 
Autocontrol is an “association of business people and we are an association of 
  
consumers. They value what happens in their sector and we value what consumers tell 
us”. Their argument is as follows: “Let’s say that the sector itself is judge and jury 
because they are the ones who make up the association of Autocontrol”. 
This perception of Autocontrol is not unique. Indeed, to some extent it is shared 
by the consumer associations or institutions we consulted. The AUC – an association 
that filed 70-80% of all association complaints in recent years – notes a similar idea 
when it asserts that, 
Autocontrol is a body for resolving conflict between advertisers. Clearly, the 
models of voluntary regulation, self-discipline and good practices were 
originally designed to resolve conflicts between competitors outside court. 
With the philosophy that if we – meaning “we” as advertisers – carry out our 
work deontologically, so to speak, with a commitment to good practices, then 
in some way we can resolve conflicts in a friendly way, and also reach a 
situation in which the administration is not so interventionist, let’s say, in 
positively regulating things. 
State-funded institutions such as the Observatory of Women’s Image have a similar 
view of Autocontrol’s philosophy. Their representative noted that:  
[t]he perception I have of Autocontrol is that when it was created it was really 
to regulate relations amongst themselves. That is, above all, disloyal 
competition. The idea is “don’t put something that makes my product look bad 
next to yours in your advert” [...] the mechanism was created more for that, to 
favour ethical advertising among advertisers. That’s why it isn’t easily 
regarded as a mechanism for ordinary citizens.  
 
  
Given the diverse natures of Autocontrol and the associations, their different 
interpretations of the principle of independence are perhaps understandable, although 
the gap between their views is also striking. The Jury members’ interpretation helps to 
complete the picture. The eight Jury members interviewed all stressed the transparency 
of the complaint-resolution process, they all noted the lack of pressure or coercion in 
participating on the Jury, and they all considered their experience on the Jury to be 
positive. Some comments were as follows: “I found a great autonomy in my own 
experience” (No. 1), “Autocontrol has some very good practices” (No. 7), and “we, the 
Jury members, enjoy absolute freedom” (No. 6). On the other hand, a careful 
examination of the resolutions from the 2015 Jury reveals no significant differences in 
the percentages of acceptance and rejection by groups. This only highlights a small 
deviation in the number of dismissed claims from individuals.  
 
Actor Favourable 
resolution 
Partially 
favourable 
resolution 
Dismissed Unfavourable 
resolution 
No. of 
claims 
Private 
Individuals 
41.18% 0.98% 54.9% 2.9% 105 
Associations 53% 2.2% 44.4%   49 
Companies 43% 18.8% 25%  12.5% 16 
  Table 2. Complaints based on Autocontrol’s Code of Conduct 2015 considering complainants and 
outcomes 
Source: The authors 
 
Furthermore, the Jury members interviewed generally considered that the 
representation and the plurality of voices were well-balanced. One interviewee argued 
that a greater representation of consumer associations might not be positive as they 
  
“adopt some approaches that are too restrictive for the practice of advertising [...] 
Consumers and consumer associations usually take a very extreme and belligerent 
position” (No. 6). This interviewee advocated maintaining the current situation with 
“university people” who understand “another perspective that is not so tied up with 
some or other approaches” (No. 6). Two Jury members (No. 3 and No. 1), however, do 
defend the need to deliberately broaden representation to include more social actors. 
Another interviewee noted that many members, even though they no longer belong to 
the industry “had worked in [advertising] companies and, of course, took the business 
perspective” (No. 3). This interviewee called for “a more diversified composition of 
members, social psychologists, experts on these issues, or independent persons” (No. 3). 
In the same vein, Jury member No. 1 stated that, “there is no space on the Jury for 
everyone”, although he does add that including another profile from “philosophy or 
ethics” would be a positive move. 
Ultimately, the study results reveal a clearly differentiated position between 
associations and members of Autocontrol on the question of Jury composition. The 
associations’ position reflects some suspicion that the SRO mechanism in some way 
acts to serve the interests of Autocontrol, while the position of Autocontrol members 
defends the overall fairness of its procedure. The Jury members, however, generally 
perceive the procedure to be appropriate, although some members called for the 
introduction of other member profiles to enrich the process (No. 1, 2, 3). These 
discrepancies illustrate the difficulties involved in defining the principle of 
independence, which has been so widely discussed and demanded in the ASR literature. 
The present study allows the complexity of this debate to be considered. On this point, 
  
one of the Autocontrol directors considered the models proposing stakeholder-based 
models of governance to be negative because:  
I don’t think any Jury members should be representing consumers, nor should 
Jury members be representing the pharmaceutical industry, nor advertisers, nor 
agencies, nor the mass media. Jury members must be independent, impartial, and 
have no links to industry [...] Neither [should they] act as spokespersons or 
representatives for anyone. They should only represent their knowledge. [...] If 
the Jury members represented different interests then we would be faced with 
discussions of sectorial interests, not in-depth discussions on how correct or 
incorrect an advertisement is. (Member of Autocontrol 1) 
 
 However, consumer associations adopt a different view, arguing that it is the 
Board of Directors (composed mostly of businesspeople from large firms) that chooses 
all the Jury members, and they believe that a multi-stakeholder governance model may 
be able to generate greater confidence in the SRO model. On this point, the AUC argues 
that “although it will never be a balanced model in which all parties have the same 
weight, I think that the decision-making bodies or the conflict resolution body should be 
more balanced, perhaps with more representatives from the social sphere.” FACUA 
defends an arbiter model with equal representation of consumers and businesspeople, 
pointing out that such a model “could be interesting, where from a situation of equality 
they decide, they resolve certain advertising conflicts”, although at the same time they 
note that “this does not exist nor does it show any signs of existing in the short- or 
medium-term future.” 
  
This study highlights the difficulty of precisely defining the term of internal and 
external actor (or “from industry” and “outsider”) in relation to advertising juries. The 
long-running debate on the principle of ASR independence inevitably continues in the 
Spanish case. For Autocontrol members it is sufficient to establish a series of conditions 
(three years with no links to companies, academic profiles, 25% appointed from 
AECOSAN proposals) to ensure a totally independent profile. For consumer 
associations, who is responsible for appointing the Jury members (mainly people from 
the business sector) and the limited profile type (mainly lawyers and advertising 
experts) usually raises suspicions about the principle of independence. For their part, 
Jury members value Autocontrol’s good practices very positively, although some 
members are open to some reforms or improvements. Furthermore, the associations and 
several members of the Jury called for heavier penalties for breaches of the code of 
conduct. The associations and certain members of the Jury (especially No. 1, 2 and 3) 
argued that stricter penalties would help to prevent repeated breaches, would help 
educate companies in self-regulation, and would improve the public’s perception of the 
independence of the association and its resolutions. However, this study has shown that 
there are areas in which Autocontrol could be improved other than changing the 
composition of the Jury or strengthening sanctions; these two key issues, linked to the 
self-regulation procedure, are discussed below.  
 
Windows of opportunity to foster participation: Challenges affecting the procedure 
 
The interviews with the actors variously involved in Autocontrol have opened up some 
windows of opportunity, especially concerning the hurdles to filing a complaint and the 
  
interpretation of the rules of conduct. We now examine the extent to which these points 
are regarded as key to stimulating and extending participation with the organisation.  
 
1) The complexity of filing a complaint 
 
On the difficulty of filing a complaint, one member of Autocontrol stated that “we offer 
the Spanish public a tool – an agile, quick and authoritative, independent means, free of 
charge, for settling complaints about any advertisement” (Autocontrol Member 2). They 
also claim that in procedures and resolutions “we try to be as informative as possible” 
(Autocontrol Member 1). However, they also acknowledged that simplifying processes 
is not always straightforward if rigour is to be maintained. The associations and the Jury 
members took different positions on this question, especially regarding the calls from 
associations to simplify the process of drafting a complaint about an advertisement 
violating the code of conduct. The associations consider the writing up of the complaint 
to be too formal and even “judicial” in that “it can sometimes discourage [people] from 
presenting the complaint” (AUC). In this regard, the Pedestrian’s Association makes the 
following argument:  
The problem we have is that we are a small association. We are more involved 
in day-to-day matters; and this type of thing, well the truth is that when there is 
a clear cause for complaint and someone gets down to the business of writing it 
down, then we encourage them, it gets written, and the process is put in 
motion. But simplifying the complaints procedure as much as possible – or 
making it more accessible – would really encourage participation, without a 
doubt. 
  
 
The Observatory of Women’s Image also makes the same point: 
In Autocontrol, you have to send a written complaint. [In Observatory of 
Women’s Image complaint system] They just have to make sure we get the 
content. [...] They don’t have to prepare a specific written report to explain 
their reasons. And this is also fundamental to encourage people to get involved 
and participate. 
 
Therefore, although the seriousness of the procedure is recognised, there are calls to 
simplify the process of presenting a complaint. The Jury members interviewed, 
however, hold different views. Some members (No. 1, 4, 6 and 7) considered the fact 
that everyone, whether from the field of advertising or outside, is entitled to file a claim, 
free of charge, to be positive and pointed out that this indeed happens. In contrast, other 
interviewees (No. 2 and 3) claimed that the complexity of the process is what influences 
the public’s ignorance about Autocontrol. The Jury members interviewed noted a 
general ignorance about these mechanisms among the public. One interviewee said, 
“because the processes are complicated and because Autocontrol [...] I think that most 
citizens do not know this” (No. 2). Autocontrol’s own advertising campaigns do not 
always explain the procedure to be followed. Specifically, one interviewee from the 
Jury stated that, “Autocontrol has its advertising campaigns, but maybe they do not 
specify to the ordinary citizen that Autocontrol has a proper [complaints] channel” (No. 
8). Indeed, while Autocontrol invests a significant amount in its advertising campaigns, 
it does not specifically mention that consumers have the right to file claims.
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2) Interpreting the rule: writing over its spirit? 
 
The pursuit of rigour in Autocontrol’s complaint-resolution procedures has opened up a 
meaningful discussion on the Spanish SRO model. Autocontrol members emphasise the 
importance of form and what is expressed in the codes. One member clearly illustrates 
this point as follows: 
Autocontrol is not a court of law. Autocontrol has no potestas and for that 
reason it is essential to gain authority, but authority in the moral sense. 
Resolutions must speak for themselves. When Autocontrol asks a company to 
withdraw its advertisement, the company should understand why it has to do so. 
It may not share the opinion, but at least it must understand it [...] Resolutions 
must not reflect the personal tastes of one person or a small group of people. It 
cannot make subjective judgements. Its task is really to make a legal judgement. 
Does this advertisement infringe a norm [or] does it not infringe a norm? 
(Autocontrol member 1) 
 
With regard to the associations, it was clear from the interviews that Autocontrol 
engages in a very formal judicial-type procedure. In this vein, the Pedestrian’s 
Association notes, for example, that “[...] we received a judicial evaluation from 
Autocontrol, that even said we were right”; CERMI concluded, for its part, that “in law, 
everything is up for debate. It can be seen as black or white but they do apply a code, 
and they rule according to that code”. Finally the Farmers’ Union stated that 
Autocontrol: “has a very powerful legal department [...] and while we considered the 
advertisement to be ridiculing the image [of farmers], they take a view based on a set of 
  
laws and they don’t see it that way, and they may be right on legal grounds, but the 
moral grounds remain, which, however, they don’t take into account”. 
This perception of the process as a legal procedure is striking considering that 
Autocontrol’s function is deontological and ethical, and that it has no legal authority. 
This perception could be due to the ‘technical’ nature of the procedure, the Jury’s 
reports and the literal interpretation rather than considering the spirit of its own codes of 
conduct and industry codes. The predominance of members with a legal background 
may also have a bearing on this issue. On this point, the opposing views of the Jury 
members on how Autocontrol interprets the rules are particularly relevant. All the Jury 
members interviewed but one (No. 8) defined the process as strictly legal. The 
dissenting member stated that “perhaps I would like to see a bit more legal formality, 
but then my experience tells me otherwise, that things are better as they are, because 
even though many legal formalities are not respected, it is a very open and very easy 
field for everyone ” (No. 8). The other members agreed, however, that Autocontrol 
takes a very strict line on which approaches are possible and the legal form they must 
take (No. 1 to 7).  
The Jury’s conclusions on the consequences of the formal interpretations of the 
norm are especially relevant. Although several members claim that the current model 
does not prevent in-depth debate on controversial cases and that such debate is “not 
necessarily restricted by the rules of Autocontrol or any other regulatory apparatus” 
(No. 7), several members highlighted the predominance of form and strict rules 
concerning content and debate. Specifically, several controversial cases were mentioned 
that could not be addressed because “if everything fell within the law, than that was 
that” (No. 2). Another Jury member shared this view, claiming that in the absence of 
  
certain rules in the code of conduct (referring to an example of child protection) “you 
are left with no case, because as there is no rule nor code to be applied, it [the 
complaint] is dismissed. But you are left with the thought that as there is no code to 
base a case on, how can that possibly be grounded?” (No. 5). In a similar line, two other 
Jury members stated that “the emphasis on the purely legal aspects avoids [going] into 
controversial aspects of advertisements that might be questioned from an ethical point 
of view” (No. 3); this is the case when considering that “the underlying problem is that 
the Jury’s remit is far too strictly limited to mere enforcement of regulations. When we 
get into controversial cases we do not introduce key aspects. We stick to a literal 
reading of the norm and do not introduce key issues such as the culture industry, for 
example” (No. 1). 
This tendency may lead to Autocontrol being considered simply as a mechanism 
to make a literal reading and interpretation in applying the norms of behaviour, while 
neglecting to promote an ethical reflection on advertising activity and messages. If that 
is the case, actors outside the advertising industry, associations and individuals may no 
longer see Autocontrol as a channel of participation, reflection and discussion. Jury 
members and consumer associations have highlighted the importance of this issue. In 
addition to the debate on the importance of independence in differentiating between 
self-service and self-regulation, they also identify the key issue of going deeper into 
content by remaining open, and initiating a review of codes of ethics, especially the 
advertising code of conduct. In this sense, it seems important to maintain this openness, 
thereby allowing members of the Jury and consumer associations to participate or give 
their views on the rules on which the Jury must base its verdict. Opening up the debate, 
  
or reviewing the code of conduct, would potentially extend the channels of participation 
as well as increasing confidence in the Jury’s resolutions.  
Finally, this case study reveals that the debate on how close a process of self-
regulation comes to the conditions of transparency, independence, and participation is 
not linked exclusively to the complex discussion on the representativeness of Jury 
members, but also to the application procedures and review of the norms of conduct.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The development of advertising self-regulatory systems (ASR), presents some 
interesting debates on the maturation of self-regulatory organisations (SRO) capable of 
maintaining rigour, independence and participation. Such organisations are capable of 
self-regulating in advertising, and do not turn into an instrument serving their own 
industry interests. The Spanish Autocontrol case shows how its self-regulatory system is 
working, especially in pursuing its legitimacy to prevent bad advertising ex ante through 
services such as Copy Advice, but also by strengthening the principles of rigour, 
independence and participation in its post facto mechanisms, such as the Advertising 
Jury. Through the design of a clear, efficient, fast and highly rigorous process, the 
Autocontrol Jury has earned recognition and trust in its activity both internally and 
externally.  
However, the composition of the Jury is more problematic because the 
difficulties mentioned in the ASR literature review on the consideration and scope of 
the independence principle once again become evident. The Spanish case shows that the 
industry is concerned to maintain the principle of independence. However, it also 
  
appears that the appointment policy should be strengthened to prevent industry interests 
from prevailing, even indirectly, as consumers suspect. There is therefore a need to 
review this composition to consider including consumer associations that are 
independent of the state and enjoy prestige in civil society, and bringing in professionals 
from areas such as ethics, sociology, or social psychology. 
This study has uncovered two important windows of opportunity that should be 
grasped to consolidate the principle of participation. The first is to make the procedure 
more straightforward for associations and individuals, and the second, to improve 
deliberative processes so that more work is done in the spirit of the rules governing self-
regulation, rather than strict applications or interpretations of the code.  
On the first issue, the data analysis of participation and complaints received 
shows an improvement in the figures and the wider range of actors using the complaints 
system. Although participation is stable, some specialised agencies (such as the 
Observatory of Women’s Image) or associations also challenge companies directly 
without going through the Autocontrol channel, particularly over issues such as 
discriminatory advertising. This study shows that Autocontrol has a good window of 
opportunity in which to revisit the way in which complaints are presented and improve 
the dynamics of this process. The association’s communication processes and self-
advertising could also be addressed more clearly to appeal to ordinary citizens and 
explicitly inform them of their right to participate in the process, so that it not only 
guarantees the promotion of the self-regulation process internally, but also extends it to 
groups of individuals and consumer associations outside the industry. 
As for the second issue, one of the most important aspects observed throughout 
this study is the need to consolidate a self-regulation model based not only on 
  
implementing and reviewing respect for the deontological codes of practice in a 
rigorous and transparent way, but also to foster discussion and open up a process to 
review the norms of conduct. It should not be forgotten that promoting ethical reflection 
on advertising activity is one of the objectives of ASR systems such as Autocontrol – as 
the association itself states. However, this task is frequently neglected, since the process 
is limited to the application or literal interpretation of a norm and involves no in-depth 
discussion of what the norm involves. This problem will worsen both for the Jury and 
other external actors if a process to revise the codes and rules is not initiated. Therefore, 
throughout this study we have seen that the debate between whether a self-regulatory 
mechanism actually does what it says on the tin, or whether it acts to serve its own 
interests, is linked to elements such as rigour, transparency or the plural 
representativeness of interests within the juries; however, it also depends on 
strengthening the processes of deliberation and revision of the rules governing the self-
regulating activity.  
This study provides a picture of Autocontrol based on the information available 
on its activities and from some of its main actors (Jury members, consumer associations, 
and Autocontrol members). Future studies could usefully focus on the vision of 
companies, communication media and the general public in order to expand and extend 
this research. However, we believe that this initial study has uncovered some basic 
features to do with the characteristics, potential and possible challenges facing this 
modern system of self-regulation. Today, Autocontrol provides good evidence that it is 
consolidating a rigorous process. However, at the same time we consider that 
simplifying certain processes, opening up discussion, reformulating its rules of conduct, 
and broadening out the Jury members’ profiles could deepen and enhance external 
  
participation in this instrument. In short, Autocontrol now has a solid foundation and a 
clear window of opportunity to commit to self-regulation that is not only deontological 
or formalistic in character, but is also critical and participatory in the pursuit of 
promoting honest advertising. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 http://www.autocontrol.es/ 
2
 Interviews were conducted with the following Autocontrol and Jury members: 
Former Jury Members: 
1. Former section chairperson. 2012–2015. N° 1 
2. Former section chairperson (appointed at the request of the 
National Consumer Institute). 2009–2015. Nº 2  
3. Former section chairperson (appointed at the request of the 
National Consumer Institute). 2009–2015. Nº 3  
4. Former section President 1999–2001 and President of Jury. Nº4  
Current Members (2016  to present) 
5. Section chairperson. Nº 5  
6. Section chairperson. N° 6  
7. Section chairperson. Nº 7 
8. Section president. Nº 8 
Autocontrol Members: 
9. Person in charge of Copy Advice and Jury. Nº 1  
10. Person in charge of Autocontrol. Nº 2 
11. Autocontrol worker. Nº 3. 
  
                                                                                                                                               
  
3
 Interviews were conducted with the following associations and representatives: 
1. Coordinator in the Area of Mediation for the Consumers’ Union of the 
Valencian Community (Unión de Consumidores de la Comunidad 
Valenciana, UCCV).  
2. President of the Association of Communications Users (Asociación de 
Usuarios de la Comunicación, AUC). 
3. Delegate from the Spanish Committee of Representatives of People with 
Disabilities (Comité Español de Representantes de Personas con 
Discapacidad, CERMI) for the UN and the Human Rights Convention. 
4. Cabinet member (communications) of the Farmers’ Union (Unió de 
Llauradors i Ramaders). 
5. President of the Pedestrians’ Association (Asociación A Pie). 
6. Speaker for The Consumers and Users Federation of Andalusia (FACUA). 
7. Head of Communications and Image for the Women’s Image Observatory 
(Observatorio de la Imagen de la Mujer). 
4
 A list of the members of the Autocontrol Board of Directors is available at: 
http://www.autocontrol.es/pdfs/Junta_Directiva_Asamblea.pdf 
5
 The National Consumer Institute merged with the Agency for Food Safety and 
Nutrition to form AECOSAN in 2014. 
6
 http://www.easa-alliance.org/Publications/Statistics/page.aspx/375 
7
 On the levels of Autocontrol participation, see also Ignacio Cruz Roche (2015). Self-
regulation of advertising in Spain. Effectiveness and efficiency of the Autocontrol 
Association (1995–2014). Autocontrol. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.4437.8966  
  
                                                                                                                                               
8
 http://www.autocontrol.es/pdfs/folleto_espanol.pdf (p. 8). During the course of this 
work, the Autocontrol members also noted the predominant role of the Jury.  
9
 Organisation: http://www.autocontrol.es/autocontrol_organizacion.shtml 
10
 Article 22 of the Statutes of Autocontrol.  
http://www.autocontrol.es/news/ESTATUTOS%20_%202014.pdf 
11
 http://www.autocontrol.es/pdfs/balance%2013%20AUTOCONTROL.pdf page 19 
12
 http://www.autocontrol.es/pdfs/balance_15_AUTOCONTROL.pdf page 24. 
13
 http://www.inmujer.gob.es/observatorios/observImg/informes/docs/Informe2014.pdf 
(pages 16-17).  
14
 The various reports issued by FACUA on Autocontrol can be consulted at 
http://www.facua.org/es/informe.php?Id=10&capitulo=90&IdAmbito=13 (Consulted 9 
May 2016). 
15
 See, for instance, 2016 spot: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8daxE6LN7mo 
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